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Abstract
Background: The majority of influenza transmission occurs in homes, schools and workplaces, where many frequently
touched communal items are situated. However the importance of transmission via fomites is unclear since few data exist
on the survival of virus on commonly touched surfaces. We therefore measured the viability over time of two H1N1
influenza strains applied to a variety of materials commonly found in households and workplaces.
Methodology and Principal Findings: Influenza A/PuertoRico/8/34 (PR8) or A/Cambridge/AHO4/2009 (pandemic H1N1)
viruses were inoculated onto a wide range of surfaces used in home and work environments, then sampled at set times
following incubation at stabilised temperature and humidity. Virus genome was measured by RT-PCR; plaque assay (for PR8)
or fluorescent focus formation (for pandemic H1N1) was used to assess the survival of viable virus.
Conclusions/Significance: The genome of either virus could be detected on most surfaces 24 h after application with
relatively little drop in copy number, with the exception of unsealed wood surfaces. In contrast, virus viability dropped
much more rapidly. Live virus was recovered from most surfaces tested four hours after application and from some non-
porous materials after nine hours, but had fallen below the level of detection from all surfaces at 24 h. We conclude that
influenza A transmission via fomites is possible but unlikely to occur for long periods after surface contamination (unless re-
inoculation occurs). In situations involving a high probability of influenza transmission, our data suggest a hierarchy of
priorities for surface decontamination in the multi-surface environments of home and hospitals.
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Introduction
Influenza transmission is well documented in households and
other residential settings [1–4]. Yet the underlying mechanisms of
transmission remain poorly understood and hotly debated [5,6].
Although transmission by aerosols (particles typically ,5 mmi n
diameter), larger droplets and contact transmission (direct and via
fomites) probably all play some role, the relative importance of
each is uncertain, which has led to difficulties regarding the
provision of evidence-based infection control advice for both
pandemic and seasonal influenza [7]. If virus can survive for
meaningful periods on surfaces and objects, or alternatively, if
surfaces are frequently re-inoculated (e.g. by toddlers), then it is
feasible that transmission via fomites might occur.
The potential for transmission of influenza by indirect contact
(i.e. via fomites) is linked to the ability of virus to survive in
transmissible titres on commonly touched surfaces; however few
data exist on this subject. Parker et al (1944) demonstrated
improved survival of influenza viruses in the presence of human
mucus [8]; and in 1962, Buckland demonstrated experimentally
that influenza virus was inactivated relatively quickly on glass,
probably through desiccation [9]. In 1982, widely cited work by
Bean et al showed that both influenza A and B, directly applied
to stainless steel surfaces or hard plastic, could survive for 24–
48 hours, and be transferred, from there to hands, for 24 hours;
survival was much shorter on porous materials such as paper and
cotton (8–12 hours), with transferability to hands for only
15 minutes [10]. In contrast, Thomas et al, recently demonstrated
survival of human seasonal A (H1N1) and A (H3N2) on Swiss
banknotes for up to three days, increasing to up to eight days when
applied with nasopharyngeal secretions from children (17 days if
applied at very high concentration). Although viable virus was
recovered at each of these time points, it was noted that virus load
declined sharply after the first few days; no other materials were
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in homes and health and childcare facilities, using RT-PCR to
establish the presence of the viral genome [12–14]. However, data
obtained using this technique (even quantitatively) do not
distinguish adequately between viable and non-viable virus and
are therefore problematic to interpret in the context of practical
infection control guidance. In another recent study, virus was
detected by PCR on commonly touched household surfaces, but
only one sample proved culture positive [15]. However, the time
from deposition to recovery was not known, nor the extent of any
cleaning undertaken.
We evaluate the survival of influenza A (H1N1) viruses
deliberately applied to a range of commonly touched household
and workplace surfaces, using RT-PCR for genome detection and
culture methods to determine viability. We conclude that RT-
PCR is only useful to demonstrate the absence of virus and that on
most surfaces, virus viability drops rapidly. Nevertheless, on
certain non-porous surfaces, viable virus persists for several hours,
rendering fomite transmission possible without re-inoculation.
Materials and Methods
To test the surface survival of influenza virus, we used a variety
of materials commonly encountered in the home and workplace,
including a hospital setting (Table 1); choice of surfaces to be tested
was discussed with the Department of Health, England to ensure
relevance to public health policy. These included fibrous materials
such as the ubiquitous J-clothH (Associated Brands) widely used for
cleaning, a silver impregnated fabric with known bacteriostatic
properties (Toray Textiles Europe Ltd.) of the type sometimes
encountered in hospital staff clothing to combat nosocomial
bacterial infections, as well as fabric from a child’s soft toy. The
latter fabric was made of non-absorbent polyester and, although a
porous item overall, individual fibres might perform as a non-
porous surface. A variety of non-porous plastic surfaces represent-
ing objects highly likely to be touched by multiple individuals such
as light switch, telephone and keyboard plastics were also tested, as
well as porous and non-porous ‘background’ materials such as
various wood surfaces, glass, Perspex/plexiglass (poly (methyl
methacrylate) - a thermoplastic often used as a light or shatter-
resistant alternative to glass) and metals. As a control surface, we
used standard laboratory polystyrene culture dishes. As viruses, we
used two human H1N1 strains: the laboratory adapted A/Puerto
Rico/8/34 (PR8) strain because of ready availability and robust,
convenient assay systems with a wide dynamic range, and an
isolate of the current 2009 pandemic virus A/Cambridge/AH04/
2009 (AH04), as a low passage history representative of a virus
likely to be encountered in the current environment. The source
and disinfection method used to clean the various surfaces before
testing are listed in Table 1.
Viruses and other materials
Human influenza A virus PR8 (Cambridge lineage) was grown
in embryonated hens’ eggs and harvested at a titre of 9610
8 pfu/
ml. For inoculation of the surfaces, the virus was diluted 1:10 in
1% BSA and serum free media (Dulbecco Modified Eagles
Medium, DMEM, Gibco, UK). This represented a viral titre
approximating 1.5610
8 TCID50/ml, just above the upper end of
titres reported for human shedding [10,11]. Preliminary experi-
ments established that virus survival was improved by the addition
of extra protein to the suspension. We tested 0.5% or 1% BSA as
well as four preparations of artificial mucus produced from pig
stomach mucosa (NBS Biologicals), pig stomach mucin types II or
III or bovine sub maxillary glands mucin, type I-S (all from Sigma
Aldrich). 1% BSA had the largest effect on titre and duration of
survival, followed by the bovine mucin (data not shown). In the
interests of simplicity and reproducibility, 1% BSA was therefore
used in all subsequent experiments.
To test a 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus strain on
selected surfaces, a clinical isolate designated influenza A/Cam-
bridge/AHO4/2009 (AH04) was passaged once in MDCK cells
and then grown in Caco-2 cells (colorectal adenocarcinoma cells,
ATCC HTB-37
TM). The virus is a recent isolate from an
Table 1. Materials tested, source and preparation prior to use.
Material Manufacturer/source Classification Preparation
J-ClothH Associated Brands LP, Toronto, Canada Porous Autoclave
1
Silver containing fabric Toray Textiles Europe Ltd, UK Porous Autoclave
Soft toy Keel Toys Ltd, UK Porous Autoclave
Control: Polystyrene 6-well tissue culture dish Falcon (Beckton Dickinson & Co., UK) Non-porous Sterile
2
Perspex (poly (methyl methacrylate) -transparent thermoplastic University of Cambridge, Clinical School workshop Non-porous Sterile
Window glass Go Glass, Cambridge, UK Non-porous Autoclave
Light switch material University of Cambridge, Clinical School workshop Non-porous Fumigation
3
Telephone handset (plastic) University of Cambridge, Clinical School workshop Non-porous Fumigation
Kitchen work surface Brushwood Ltd, Great Shelford, UK Non-porous Fumigation
Computer keyboard University of Cambridge, Clinical School workshop Non-porous Fumigation
Pine (unsealed) Local work surface manufacturer, Cambridge, UK Porous Fumigation
Varnished oak Local work surface manufacturer, Cambridge, UK Non-porous Fumigation
Unvarnished oak Local work surface manufacturer, Cambridge, UK Porous Fumigation
Stainless steel University of Cambridge, Clinical School workshop Non-porous Fumigation
Aluminium University of Cambridge, Clinical School workshop Non-porous Fumigation
1.Autoclaved 121uC, 15 minutes.
2.Received sterile in packaging from manufacturer.
3.Fumigation in a CLIII room using a Laycock Fumigator (Tolbest Ltd).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027932.t001
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of their illness, but recovered. This virus does not form discrete
plaques in MDCK cells and could therefore not be titred by this
method. Instead, virus stocks were quantified by qPCR for
segment 7 [12]. Although this method scores viable and non-viable
virus particles alike, preparations of wild type influenza A viruses
generally have similar particle:PFU ratios and quantitative
comparison of RT-PCR and other titration methods have shown
good agreement [13,14]. The AH04 stock contained 6.5610
8
genome copies/ml and was used at a 1:10 dilution as for PR8. For
comparison, the PR8 stock had a genome titre of 1.6610
11
genome copies/ml.
Mouse monoclonal AA5H (Abcam) was used to detect influenza
NP by immunofluorescence.
Survival assay
Surfaces were cut into 2 cm
2 pieces and sterilised by a variety of
means depending on the surface to be tested (e.g. autoclaving,
fumigation etc). Sterile surfaces were glued into sterile 6-well
tissue culture dishes using cyanoacrylate adhesive (Henkel, UK).
Preliminary experiments (data not shown) demonstrated that dried
adhesive alone was non-inhibitory to influenza virus. Under the
same conditions of temperature and humidity (ranges 17–21uC
and 23–24% respectively), 10 ml volumes of virus were applied to
six samples of each surface at the same time. Sampling was
conducted immediately – time zero – to demonstrate recoverabil-
ity. A cotton swab was moistened by dipping in 3 ml of virus
transport medium (VTM, Remel, UK) and then wiped carefully in
6 different directions for 1 minute across the top of the surface.
Keeping everything on ice, the swab was placed into the tube
containing the residual (3 ml) volume of VTM and vortexed for
1 minute. After this, the sample was split directly into 6 eppendorf
tubes and stored on dry ice prior to freezing at 270uC. The
remaining samples in the plate were kept in a plastic, lidded box at
constant temperature and humidity. At 4, 9, 24, 48 and 72 hrs,
further samples were taken and stored. After initial experiments it
was clear that the virus did not survive in detectable amounts for
more than 24 hrs, therefore for the majority of the experiments
only the first 4 time points (0, 4, 9, and 24 hrs) were taken. Initial
experiments with PR8 virus also showed that loss of virus on the
swab was not a major factor, with recovery of virus at time zero
from polypropylene surfaces approaching 50% of initial titre (data
not shown).
Virus titration
The qRT-PCR assay used has been described previously [12].
In brief, primers and probes to the Matrix gene of influenza A
were used to detect the presence of the virus on the surfaces.
Samples from all time points were stored and then extracted. Virus
genome was amplified to check that the quantity of virus deposited
on the different surfaces was consistent and to determine whether
any of the surfaces affected the genome over time.
Plaque assays were performed as previously described in
MDCK cells using Avicell overlays [15,16], in duplicate or where
possible in triplicate.
To detect AH04 virus by fluorescent focus assay, infectious
material from swabs was first allowed to amplify by inoculation
into 1610
6 MDCK cells and incubation for 48 h. Supernatant
virus was then diluted 1:10 in serum free DMEM and 250 ml used
to inoculate 1.5610
5 MDCK cells in a 24 well tissue culture plate.
After virus absorption, the cells were overlaid with 1 ml serum free
DMEM media containing 1 mg/ml Worthington’s trypsin and
0.14% BSA and incubated overnight at 37uC. The following day
they were fixed with 4% formaldehyde in PBS, permeabilised by
the addition of 0.2% Triton6100 in PBS for 5 minutes at RT and
fluorescently stained with anti-NP monoclonal antibody and
counterstained for DNA with 4,6-diamino-2-phenylindole (DAPI)
as previously described [17]. Cells were examined blind by two
people and scored semi quantitatively for the presence of infected
cells using a standardised schema (2 no fluorescence seen; +/2
some fluorescence seen (,5% cells infected); +5–10% cells
infected; ++ .10% cells infected). The literature indicates
immunofluorescence to be at least as sensitive in general as
plaque assay [13,18,19]. Confirming this, tests using serial
dilutions of known quantities of PR8 virus, our method reliably
detected 20 PFU of virus in the original sample prior to
amplification and 50% of the time detected 2 PFU (data not
shown).
Results
To test the surface survival of the virus genome, replicate
samples of the various materials were inoculated with 10 ml
samples containing 1610
6 PFU of virus and incubated for defined
periods of time before sample recovery was attempted by
swabbing. It was noted that the liquid was absorbed by the
wooden surfaces within 5 minutes whereas a droplet could be seen
on non-porous surfaces for considerably longer, although in all
cases, surfaces had dried by 7 hours. Material eluted from the
swabs was then titred for virus genome by quantitative RT-PCR.
For both PR8 (Fig. 1A, Table 2) and AH04 (Table 3) viruses the
results were unambiguous. On most surfaces, the viral genome
persisted well, with only around a 10–100 fold drop from the
initially recoverable titre after 24 h. The exceptions were unsealed
wood surfaces, where both viruses lost genome titre rapidly and on
pine surfaces in particular, became undetectable after a few hours.
Thus in general, viral RNA survives well for at least 24 h and few
surfaces had any significant ‘contact effect’ in immediately
reducing genome titre.
When PR8 surface viability was assessed by plaque assay, virus
inoculated onto a control surface of a tissue culture dish could be
recovered efficiently at t0, but thereafter infectivity fell away
rapidly with no live virus recovered at 24 h (Table 4). Fitting the
data to a one-phase exponential decay model (Fig. 1B) estimated
the t1/2 of the virus under these conditions to be around 1.5 h. A
similar pattern of rapid loss of infectivity was seen when the
household surface samples were tested, with the difference that
greater initial losses of infectivity ranging between 20-fold
(telephone handset) to nearly 4000-fold (unsealed pine) were seen
(Table 4). Nevertheless, viable virus was recovered at 4 h (but not
later) from the silver-impregnated cloth, soft toy fabric and in trace
quantities, from light switch material. The only material (other
than the control tissue culture dish) for which even low amounts of
viable virus could be detected at 9 h was stainless steel. Thus
despite the persistence of the viral genome on a wide variety of
household surfaces, PR8 infectivity decayed sharply, with evidence
of significant contact effects from some materials; most notably
unsealed pine, but also a wide variety of other porous and non-
porous surfaces.
To test whether these findings could be extrapolated to a
currently circulating virus, we next tested the survival of AH04
virus, a 2009 pandemic isolate, on a subset of the materials. Unlike
PR8, as a recent clinical isolate this virus does not grow to high
titres in the laboratory and nor was a workable plaque assay
available. We therefore used a fluorescent focus assay in which live
virus is detected by immunofluorescent detection of the viral
nucleoprotein in infected cells. To boost the sensitivity with which
viable virus could be detected, infectious virus present in the swabs
Influenza Survival on Household Materials
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assay. The assay therefore provides a highly sensitive but semi
quantitative measure of virus infectivity, ideally suited to working
with low titre samples [13,19]. By this measure, the AH04 virus
persisted for at least 24 h on the control tissue culture dish
material, although titres were evidently lower at 9 and 24 h
(Table 5). Consistent with the results obtained with PR8 virus, all
household surfaces tested showed lower persistence of infectious
virus, with none providing recoverable titre at 24 h and the
majority failing to produce live material at 9 h. Once again the
pine surface showed very rapid inactivation of viability, with no
infectivity recovered at 4 h. Thus both an historic virus isolate and
an example of the recent pandemic strain fail to survive in high
titres for long periods of time on a variety of household surfaces,
but with significant survival over shorter time spans on certain
materials.
Discussion
Prior to the influenza A(H1N1) pandemic of 2009–10, few data
were available with regard to virus survival on different household
Figure 1. Surface survival of PR8 virus. Virus inoculated onto various surfaces was titred by (A) for genome by RT-PCR or (B) viable virus by
plaque assay at the indicated times. Data points were fitted with models for one-phase exponential decay using the program Prism 5 (Graph Pad
Software). Lower limit of detection values were used in place of zeros. Values in (A) are from a single determination, while (B) is the mean 6 SEM of
two or three replicates. Dashed lines indicate the limit of detection.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027932.g001
Table 2. Detection of influenza PR8 virus genome on
different surfaces.
Log10 reduction in genome copy
number after indicated contact
time (hrs)
Surface Type* 0 4 9 24
J-cloth P, NM 20.26 0.16 0.09 0.79
Silver containing cloth P, M 1.51 1.38 2.30 1.74
Soft toy P, NM 20.26 0.23 0.48 0.71
Window glass NP, NM 20.18 0.06 0.48 0.38
Light switch material NP, NM 1.28 1.16 2.86 1.58
Telephone handset NP, NP 0.95 1.32 1.46 2.76
Kitchen work surface NP, NM 2.09 2.25 2.00 2.20
Computer keyboard NP, NM 1.97 1.29 2.44 2.20
Stainless steel NP, M 20.35 0.03 0.06 0.06
Aluminium NP, NM 1.40 1.67 2.12 2.12
Pine P, NM 2.06 3.84 4.82 .6.9
Varnished oak NP, NM 1.27 1.16 1.90 2.49
Unvarnished oak P, NM 1.27 1.48 2.95 3.16
Plastic control
{ NP, NM 20.35 20.48 0.06 0.20
*P=porous; NP=non-porous; M=metallic; NM=non-metallic.
Values plotted are the log10 reduction in genome copy number with respect to
the input inoculum. Under the assay conditions, 100% recovery would have
resulted in a titre of 1.6610
8 genome copies/ml and the lower limit of detection
was ,20 copies/ml.
{Plastic control=virus applied directly to the tissue culture dish surface.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027932.t002
Table 3. Detection of influenza AH04 virus genome on
different surfaces.
Log10 reduction in genome copy
number after indicated contact
time (hrs)
Surface Type* 0 4 9 24
Soft toy P, NM 0.31 0.67 0.70 1.64
Glass NP, NM 20.12 0.43 0.38 0.81
Kitchen work surface NP, NM 0.00 20.92 0.81 1.37
Computer
keyboard
NP, NM 20.01 0.70 1.31 1.17
Stainless steel NP, M 0.24 0.41 0.53 1.38
Pine (unsealed) P, NM 20.33 1.45 2.43 .4.5
Plastic control
1 NP, NM 0.27 0.87 1.06 1.11
*P=porous; NP=non-porous; M=metallic; NM=non-metallic.
Values plotted are the log10 reduction in genome copy number with respect to
the input inoculum. Under the assay conditions, 100% recovery would have
resulted in a titre of 6.5610
5 genome copies/ml and the lower limit of detection
was ,20 copies/ml.
1Plastic control=virus applied directly to the tissue culture dish surface.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027932.t003
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studies had been carried out based on RT-PCR to detect the
presence of the genome [20–22]; these shed no light on the
presence or absence of viable virus. In this study we sought to
provide contemporary data about virus survival on a wider range
of materials found in or on household surfaces than previously
described in the literature; these exemplars were chosen after
discussion with UK pandemic policy makers. However, one
limitation is that our study was confined to H1N1 influenza A
viruses (PR8 and the 2009 pandemic virus) due to resource issues.
However, we know of no evidence to suggest there are substantial
differences in survival between human influenza viruses. More-
over, when we compared the survival of PR8 virus with two
seasonal isolates of influenza A (A/Solomon Islands/12/5/08
(H1N1) and influenza A/Brisbane/12/5/08 (H3N2), obtained
from Professor Alan Hay of the National Institute of Medical
Research, Mill Hill), we saw no significant differences, with all
three viruses losing plaque titre on a plastic surface with a t1/2 of
around 90 minutes (data not shown). We therefore think it is
reasonable to generalise from the findings here to other human
strains of influenza A. Further studies, especially of influenza B are
warranted however.
We applied concentrations of virus (,1610
6 TCID50), which
were within the range of those reported in the respiratory
secretions of naturally infected individuals [5,10]. In addition, we
suspended virus in 1% bovine serum albumin (BSA), reflecting our
(unpublished) finding that BSA improved virus survival, and
similar findings from Thomas et al [11] using mucus obtained
from children. Our experiments were conducted within a narrow
range of humidity and temperature conditions consistent with
normal human indoor living conditions in temperate zones, and all
survival assays were performed in duplicate and where possible
triplicate. We used plaque assay techniques and immunofluores-
cence techniques for PR8 and pandemic viruses, respectively. The
differing methodologies used to detect the two strains of H1N1
virus (lower titre inoculum of the pandemic AH04 virus but higher
sensitivity detection method) make it difficult to directly compare
the survival of the two strains, but we see little to suggest any major
difference.
Our data on the survival of the laboratory adapted PR8 virus
indicated that viable virus was no longer recoverable in detectable
amounts from 9 of 14 (64%) surfaces four hours after deposition;
however, contrary to the findings of Bean et al., non-porous
surfaces were not consistently more conducive to virus survival
than porous ones [10]. Nevertheless, no test surfaces supported
detectable virus survival beyond nine hours. Broadly similar
outcomes in which infectivity tended to be lost after 4–9 hours
were obtained with the recent pandemic isolate AH04. Overall,
our results indicate that influenza virus does not remain viable in
large quantities on most surfaces in indoor domestic conditions for
more than a few hours. Our data are consistent with recent
findings from a study of environmental deposition of pandemic
H1N1 virus in the homes of infected patients, involving our
laboratory, when almost 10% of tested surfaces yielded viable virus
[15]. However, in this and similar studies in community settings
where environmental samples are taken relatively infrequently and
the infectious source remains present, it is not possible to establish
the time elapsed since virus deposition [15,23].
With regard to the testing of specific materials, we examined
survival on a range of porous items: a children’s soft toy, a silver
impregnated fabric with known bacteriostatic properties of the
type sometimes encountered in hospital staff clothing to combat
nosocomial bacterial infections, and a branded cleaning cloth (J
clothH, Associated Brands). We hypothesised that the inclusion of
an antimicrobial agent, MicrobanH (Microban International Ltd)
in the J cloth might inhibit viral growth. MicrobanH is based on
triclosan and has been demonstrated to have anti-bacterial and
anti-fungal activity; it has not however, been demonstrated or
claimed to be anti-viral. Notwithstanding, in our laboratory
setting, some constituent or quality of the J clothH appeared to
limit virus survival to under 4 hours. The result for the silver
impregnated fabric also deserves further comment. Whilst silver
has been demonstrated to have bacteriostatic properties, it has not
been documented to show antiviral activity. Our data would tend
to suggest that it is not significantly inhibitory to influenza A.
Table 4. Survival of influenza PR8 on porous, non-porous,
metallic and wood surfaces.
Log10 reduction in infectivity after
indicated contact time (hrs)
Surface Type* 0 4 9 24
J-cloth P, NM 1.8 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Silver containing cloth P, M 2.9 3.2 .4.2 .4.2
Soft toy P, NM 1.9 2.8 .4.2 .4.2
Window glass NP, NM 1.6 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Light switch material NP, NM 2.8 4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Telephone handset NP, NP 1.3 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Kitchen work surface NP, NM 3.1 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Computer keyboard NP, NM 3.4 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Stainless steel NP, M 1.7 3.2 3.9 .4.2
Aluminium NP, NM 2.8 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Pine P, NM 3.6 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Varnished oak NP, NM 2.0 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Unvarnished oak P, NM 2.8 .4.2 .4.2 .4.2
Plastic control
{ NP, NM 0.6 3.4 4.2 .4.2
*P=porous; NP=non-porous; M=metallic; NM=non-metallic.
Values plotted are the log10 reduction in plaque titre with respect to the input
inoculum and are the mean of 2–3 replicates. Under the assay conditions, 100%
recovery would have resulted in a titre of 3610
5 PFU/ml and the lower limit of
detection was 20 PFU/ml.
{Plastic control=virus applied directly to the tissue culture dish surface.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027932.t004
Table 5. Survival of influenza AH04 on a representative range
of household surfaces.
Recovery of AH04 virus after
contact time (hrs)
Surface Type* 0 4 9 24
Soft toy P, NM +
x ___
Pine (unsealed) P, NM + ___
Kitchen work surface NP, NM + + +/2 _
Glass NP, NM + + + _
Stainless steel NP, M ++ + __
Plastic control
{ NP, NM ++ + /2 +/2
*P=porous; NP=non-porous; M=metallic; NM=non-metallic.
2 no fluorescence seen; +/2 some fluorescence seen (,5% cells infected);
+ 5–10% cells infected; ++ .10% cells infected.
{Plastic control=virus applied directly to the tissue culture dish surface.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027932.t005
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and nine hours) included light switch material (polyvinyl chloride)
and a computer keyboard. Interestingly these are likely to be the
materials from which the most frequently touched communal
household objects are made. Both PR8 and pandemic viruses
survived less than four hours on all of the wood surfaces tested.
This may have been due to a number of factors including porosity
of the surface, oils in the wood or a potentially virucidal ‘contact
effect’ of varnish finishes. Pine oil in particular has been
demonstrated to have virucidal activity against respiratory viruses
[24]. Our findings suggest they are not hospitable environments
for enveloped viruses.
As observed in other studies, we found that stainless steel
supported the viability of influenza viruses longer than other tested
metals. Metals have been demonstrated to have low levels of anti
viral activity [25–27]; and stainless steel has previously been
demonstrated to support influenza virus viability for longer than
that of copper [28]. Confirmation of these results raises questions
about the use of stainless steel in healthcare and daycare settings in
particular.
In conclusion, testing two H1N1 strains of influenza A (one of
which was a 2009 pandemic virus) demonstrates that in an
environment that is consistent with indoor domestic settings in
temperate zones, virus deposited onto the touched environment is
likely to survive up to a few hours, though rarely more than nine
hours, on the vast majority of surfaces. Metallic and non-metallic
non-porous materials pose the greatest risk and should be targeted
for frequent cleaning if situated in close proximity to patients
infected with influenza virus; fortunately the latter are also more
conducive to surface cleaning with a wide variety of simple
cleaning agents [12]. Whilst our data suggest that the risk of virus
transmission might last several hours after deposition, we
generated very little data suggesting that appreciable amounts of
virus survived much beyond nine hours. This probably means that
frequently touched environments such as classrooms, offices and
living rooms, which are then left unoccupied overnight, will not
contain much viable virus on surfaces by the next morning.
Nevertheless, the data still support frequent cleaning of commonly
touched items and surfaces throughout the working day,
particularly when symptomatic persons are present, for example
in physician waiting rooms. In terms of cleaning regimens, one
critically important consideration is that survival of virus in high
titres for prolonged periods is not necessary for fomite transmission
if surfaces are frequently re-inoculated (e.g. by toddlers). However
the contribution of such indirect transmission relative to
respiratory droplets directly from one person to another or relative
to aerosol transmission remains unknown.
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